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I. INTRODUCMON
On January 1, 1994, after more than two years of negotiations' and intense
national debate, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into
force.2 NAFTA's primary aim is to promote economic development in the United
States, Mexico, and Canada through the establishment of a unified market.'
When fully implemented, NAFTA will eliminate impediments to the flow of
goods, services, and capital throughout the North American continent.4 The
agreement will form one of the world's largest and most lucrative markets,
comprising 360 million consumers and generating $6.4 trillion in output of goods
and services.' In endorsing NAFTA, each signatory country resolved to create
1. The NAFFA negotiations formally began in June 1991 and proceeded under the fast track authority
extended by the U.S. Congress to President George Bush. Jima Ikegawa, Comment, NAFTA: How Will It Affect
U.S. Environmental Regulations?, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 225, 228 (1993). Under fast track procedure, the
President had authority to negotiate a trade agreement and submit it to Congress for approval without
amendment. Id. Negotiations were concluded in September 1993 upon finalization of the supplemental
agreements on Labor Cooperation, Environmental Cooperation, and Emergency Action. North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, NAFTA File [hereinafter
Supplemental Agreement]; North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, NAFTA File; Understanding Between the Parties to the North American Free Trade
Agreement Concerning Chapter Eight, EMERGENCY ACTION, Sept. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nsamer
Library, NAFTA File. Note that all references to the Supplemental Agreement are to the September 13, 1993
draft.
2. On November 17, 1993, NAFTA and its supplemental agreements were passed by the House of
Representatives by a vote of 234 to 200, a wider margin than expected. Lively NAFTA Debate Leads to Free
Trade Victory (CNN news broadcast, Nov. 18, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File. Passage
through the Senate was secured on November 20, 1993 by a vote of 61 to 38. James Gerstenzang, Senate
Approves NAFTA on 61-38 Vote, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at A18. On December 8, 1993, President Bill
Clinton signed the NAFTA implementing legislation passed by Congress. Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for North American Affairs David Weiss, Address at the Canadian-American Business Council
Luncheon (Feb. 16, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, NAFTA File. The three governments exchanged
diplomatic notes on December 30, 1993 to implement NAFTA and the supplemental agreements. Id.
3. See North American Free Trade Agreement, pmbl. [hereinafter NAFIA]. All references to NAFTA
are to the December 17, 1992 draft.
4. See NAFIA, supra note 3, art. 102 (setting forth the agreement's objectives).
5. Shellyn G. McCaffrey, North American Free Trade and Labor Issues: Accomplishments and
Challenges, 10 HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 449, 451 (1993).
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new employment opportunities, enforce basic workers' rights, and improve
working conditions and living standards in its territory.
Despite this mutual resolution, NAFTA's main text is devoid of any
provisions designed to mandate improvements in labor matters.7 This omission
generated heated debate, and NAFTA's opponents' demanded negotiation of a
new agreement. 9 Detractors maintained that, despite stringent labor laws, the
Mexican government does not adequately enforce workers' rights, but instead
colludes with labor union leaders to suppress and control the labor force.10
Detractors argued that the United States must not enter a trade agreement with a
country that fails to protect the rights of its workers.'
During his presidential campaign, President Bill Clinton shared these
concerns, and vowed to include supplemental legislation aimed at exposing and
improving inadequate enforcement of Mexican labor laws. 2 The North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 13 signed on September 13, 1993, pledges each
country to enforce its domestic labor laws and establishes a trinational commis-
sion to engage in collaboration, information exchange, and dispute resolution. 4
By establishing a forum for the exchange of ideas and information, the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation provides a new mechanism for
6. NAFTA, supra note 3, pmbl.
7. NAFrA's only labor-related provisions seek to avoid job losses by encouraging gradual and orderly
adjustment to increased trade flows. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 302 & ch. 4 (setting forth the transition
requirement and rules of origin); infra notes 28-53 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of labor-
related matters in NAFrA).
8. To generalize, NAFTA's opponents included U.S. labor organizations, human and civil rights
activists, and some Mexican workers. See Peter Behr, What NAFTA Is About, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1993, at
A6 (explaining concerns of U.S. labor organizations that U.S. companies would move to Mexico to capitalize
on its cheap workforce); Juanita Darling, Mexico's Angst Over NAFTA, L.A. TlMFS, Oct. 17, 1993, at D1
[hereinafter Mexico's Angst] (reporting that many rank and file Mexican workers fear that NAFrA, in opening
Mexican markets to foreign competition, will threaten their jobs); see also On the Other Side of the Mexican
Border Free Trade Might Not Be Much of a Bargain, 24 NAT'L J. 506 (1992) (describing the lives of
maquiladora workers who believe that free trade will worsen their squalid living conditions).
9. See generally Dedra L. Wilburn, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Sending U.S. Jobs
South of the Border, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 489, 507 (1992) (arguing that NAFTA must not be
passed unless safeguards are drafted to guarantee higher labor standards); Stanley M. Spracker & Gregory J.
Mertz, Labor Issues Under the NAFTA: Options in the Wake of the Agreement, 27 INT'L. LAW. 737, 744-50
(1993) (suggesting" options to enhance NAFTA's labor protections).
10. See infra notes 104-38 and accompanying text (documenting nonenforcement of Mexican labor laws
and explaining the close alliance between the ruling political party and the largest federation of Mexican labor
unions).
11. See generally Wilburn, supra note 9, at 489 (demanding that NAFTA include stronger labor
protections).
12. Spracker & Mertz, supra note 9, at 738; Sand in the Wheels of Trade, ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1993,
at 25. The President also promised supplemental agreements addressing environmental concerns and potential
import surges. Id. This comment addresses only labor issues under NAFTA and the North American Agreement
on Labor Cooperation.
13. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1.
14. Id.
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analyzing and influencing Mexican labor relations policies. 5 Because it
represents a compromise between three sovereign nations, however, it is not the
final solution to inadequate enforcement of Mexican labor laws. 6 Rather than
be considered a failure for neglecting to address every conceivable problem, the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation should be regarded as a first
step toward the ultimate goal of protecting workers' rights throughout the North
American continent.
This comment analyzes the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(Supplemental Agreement) and attempts to ascertain whether it will improve
enforcement of Mexican labor laws. The focus is on current working conditions
in Mexico, and the potential ways in which NAFTA and the Supplemental
Agreement may affect the Mexican workforce. Part II sets forth background
information necessary to understand why NAFFA was submitted together with the
Supplemental Agreement. 7 This section documents the Mexican government's
failure to adequately enforce its labor laws, and describes the debate that this
nonenforcement generated in the United States. Part III details the purposes and
provisions of the Supplemental Agreement, highlighting its weaknesses. 18 Part
IV discusses the significance of the Supplemental Agreement's shortcomings in
light of the purposes of a free trade agreement.' 9 Additionally, this section
suggests other possibilities, aside from the Supplemental Agreement, that may
compel improvements in Mexican labor law enforcement. Finally, part V
concludes by speculating about the signatory governments' motives for signing
the Supplemental Agreement.20 An understanding of their motives is crucial in
predicting whether the Supplemental Agreement will have its intended beneficial
effect on Mexican labor relations policies.
II. BACKGROUND
In the mid-1980s, Mexico began to reform its economic policy to reduce the
government's role in the economy and to allow market forces freer reign.2,
Reduced tariffs, coupled with reductions in nontariff barriers which restricted
15. See NAFTA's Effect on Labor Issues: Hearing of the Employment and Housing Subcomm. of the
House Government Operations Comm., Oct. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NAFTA File
[hereinafter Hearing on NAFTA's Effect] (Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa stating that the
Supplemental Agreement provides a mechanism for exposing labor problems that did not previously exist
between the United States and Mexico).
16. See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text (explaining that sovereignty concerns prevent NAFrA
and the Supplemental Agreement from interfering excessively with each country's domestic policies).
17. See infra notes 21-140 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 141-231 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 232-50 and accompanying text.
20. See infra part V.
21. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 458.
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imports, 22 have transformed Mexico's economy from one of the world's most
protected to an economy that is relatively open and free.' Mexico is now one
of the world's fastest growing economies, and Mexicans are buying an increasing
amount of American goods.24 Since 1986, U.S. exports to Mexico have increased
more than threefold, from $12.6 billion to $45 billion, ' and the U.S. trade
balance with Mexico has swung from a $5.7 billion deficit to a $5.4 billion sur-
plus. 26 NAFTA seeks to promote further growth and to create new trade
opportunities by gradually phasing out the remaining tariffs and other barriers
mutually imposed by the United States, Canada, and Mexico.27
A. NAFTA's Treatment of Labor Issues
The preamble to NAFTA addresses labor-related matters: "The governments
of Canada, Mexico and the United States resolved to: ... create new employment
opportunities and improve working conditions and living standards in their
respective territories;. .. [and] protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights
.... 28 Due primarily to concerns about sovereignty, however, NAIFTA contains
no mechanisms to implement or enforce these goals.29 As a result, the Supple-
mental Agreement was drafted to address disparities in working conditions and
in labor law enforcement between the United States and Mexico.3"
1. Provisions Relevant to Labor
While NAFTA does not include specific provisions to improve working or
living conditions, or to protect workers' rights, labor concerns were a driving
force behind parts of the agreement.31 These provisions are designed to avert job
losses by promoting gradual adjustment to changes in the flow of trade and
investment.32 For instance, to allow industries on both sides of the border to
adapt to increased competition, NAFTA establishes a transition period during
22. Examples of nontariff barriers include import quotas, licensing regulations, and minimum local
content requirements. Id at 452, 459.
23. Id at 458.
24. John E. Pepper, NAFTA Adds Jobs: It's in the Chips, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 1993, at 1 A.
25. Patrick McCartney, NAFTA Expected to Increase County Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1993, at B1.
26. See Press Conference on the Topic of the North American Free Trade Agreement, Fed. News Serv.,
Aug. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NAFTA File [hereinafter NAFTA Press Conference]
(announcing the drafting of the supplemental agreements and discussing NAFTA's benefits).
27. Behr, supra note 8, at A6.
28. NAFTA, supra note 3, pmbl.
29. Spracker & Mertz, supra note 9, at 737.
30. See infra notes 70-85, 104-38 and accompanying text (discussing concerns of NAFTA's opponents
and documenting labor law violations in Mexico).
31. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 302 & ch. 4 (setting forth the transition requirements and rules of
origin).
32. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 466.
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which duties will be phased out.33 In addition, NAFTA contains strict rules of
origin to ensure that products meet minimal North American content standards to
qualify for preferential treatment.' The rules are designed to prevent foreign
companies from manufacturing or assembling their products in one of the NAFTA
countries just to export them cheaply into another NAFTA market. 35 Without
such regulations, an influx of imports into a NAFTA country would harm
industries and workers that produce similar products.36 While these safeguards
should prevent job losses, NAFTA does not address improvement of labor
policies in areas such as minimum wages, the rights of workers to organize trade
unions, or the right to call a strike.37
2. Protection of "Free" Trade and National Sovereignty
The NAFTA negotiators had compelling reasons for limiting the content of
the agreement.3 8 Of primary importance is that NAFTA is a free trade agree-
ment, not a treaty of association such as the one that binds members of the Euro-
pean Union. 39 As such, it cannot cover all social and economic issues or attempt
to resolve all bilateral problems.40 An overly restrictive agreement would only
impose further barriers to trade, thereby defeating the purpose of a free trade
agreement. 4' Yet pressures to address disparities in wages, labor law enforce-
ment, and the standard of living persisted between the United States and
Mexico.42 Chief among those exerting pressure were opponents reluctant to
33. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 302; McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 467.
34. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 463; see NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 4 (detailing the rules of origin
provisions).
35. See McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 463, 468 (describing the reasons for including rules of origin in
NAFrA).
36. Id at 463.
37. See Spracker & Mertz, supra note 9, at 737 (noting the absence of provisions designed to improve
working conditions or to enhance workers' rights).
38. See infra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of a free trade agreement and
sovereignty concerns).
39. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 472. NAFTA's goals-the free movement of goods, services, and
investment-are much more modest than those pursued by the European Union, which is taking form after
nearly 40 years of discussions, agreements, and negotiations, as well as billions of dollars of transfers to lower
income member states. Id. at 473. In contrast to NAFTA, the European Union is scheduled to have a single,
integrated market and a common currency, as well as a social charter to harmonize workplace standards and
minimum wage levels. Id.; Jerome I. Levinson, The Labor Side Accord to the North American Free Trade
Agreement: An Endorsement ofAbuse of Worker Rights in Mexico, ECON. POL'Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER (Econ.
Pol'y Inst., Wash., D.C.), Sept. 1993, at 15-16. But see id. at 16 (arguing that NAFrA is more than a trade
agreement, and must therefore make a greater effort to harmonize disparate labor policies and conditions).
40. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 472.
41. Id.
42. See Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non.Trade Issues in the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 24 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391, 418 (1993) (describing the pressure on the Clinton
administration to demonstrate that enough progress had been made on labor issues to justify forming a free trade
agreement with Mexico).
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support an agreement with Mexico due to widespread nonenforcement of its labor
laws.43
As a result of these competing concerns, the Bush administration, in negotia-
ting NAFTA, dealt with labor issues on a parallel track rather than directly in
NAFTA. 4' To ensure NAFTA's passage by Congress, as well as to fulfill his
campaign promises to the American public, President Clinton was required to
offer assurances of Mexico's commitment to uphold and improve its labor laws
and policies.4 The Clinton administration utilized a parallel track similar to the
approach taken by the Bush administration in negotiating a labor supplemental
agreement to be implemented simultaneously with NAFTA.46
Respect for national sovereignty and for each country's cultural and political
identity were important issues in negotiating the Supplemental Agreement.47 In
particular, U.S. sovereignty prevented NAFrA from delegating too much power
to an international labor commission. 4' A supplemental agreement could not
usurp the U.S. government's ability to develop labor relations policy, nor to
enforce its labor laws.49 The Mexican government's position was that the side
agreement must not purport to modify Mexican domestic policy, which neces-
sarily includes government-union relations and workplace regulation. Indeed,
a free trade agreement such as NAFTA could not legitimately be used to force
social change on another country by imposing U.S. labor law as the standard.51
Through the Supplemental Agreement, each country pledges to enforce its own
43. See McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 461-62 (noting concerns of U.S. labor organizations that lax
enforcement of labor rights and standards in Mexico will lead to a flight of U.S. investors seeking to capitalize
on low production costs); infra notes 70-85, 104-38 and accompanying text (describing arguments against
NAFrA and documenting Mexican labor law violations).
44. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 472. In May 1991, President Bush committed his administration to
pursuing a bilateral cooperation program on labor issues with Mexico. Id. at 474. The U.S. Department of Labor
and the Mexican Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
providing a framework for mutual cooperation in the areas of health and safety, general working conditions,
labor standards and their enforcement, and procedures for resolving labor conflicts. l at 471. The principal
activities during the operation of the MOU were the development of comparative studies, information exchange,
and education and training of representatives of government, labor, and management. Id. at 478-86.
45. Zamora, supra note 42, at 417-18.
46. See infra notes 145-235 and accompanying text (outlining the purposes and provisions of the
Supplemental Agreement).
47. Hearing on NAFTA's Effect, supra note 15 (statement of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus
Yerxa); Canada Opposes Use of Trade Sanctions, 142 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 367, 368 (March 29, 1993) (News
& Background Info.).
48. Hearing on NAFTA's Effect, supra note 15 (statement of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus
Yerxa).
49. Id.
50. James Zimmerman, Laboring Under No Illusions, RECORDER, July 30, 1993, at 6; see Zamora, supra
note 42, at 432 (explaining that the U.S. government should use caution in trying to influence Mexican labor
policy because of the vital role it plays in the Mexican political and legal systems).
51. See Zamora, supra note 42, at 433 (advising that the United States should not dictate the timing or
content of Mexican labor reforms).
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domestic labor laws.52 This commitment is enforced through a policy of collabo-
ration, cooperation, and information exchange among the three countries."
B. NAFTA: Arguments Pro and Con
Free trade is regarded by many as having numerous beneficial effects. But
because NAF'A links two economically strong countries with a substantially less
developed country, the agreement has generated heated debate.54 Much of the
debate focuses on NAFTA's potential effects on Mexico and its labor force.55
NAFrA's proponents argue that the Mexican economy will grow tremendously
as a result of increased foreign investment and access to foreign products. 56 On
the other hand, opponents contend that repressive labor relations policies and
extremely low wages will provide an incentive for U.S. companies to migrate to
Mexico to exploit its cheap, oppressed labor force.57
1. Arguments in Support of NAFTA
NAFFA proponents predict benefits for Mexico and Mexican workers.58 In
particular, foreign investment in Mexico should increase markedly as a result of
NAFIA. 59 Foreign investment will spur growth in the Mexican economy by
increasing productivity, generating exports, creating jobs and higher wages, and
upgrading technology."° To foster this projected increase in investment, a new
Mexican foreign investment law was enacted on December 27, 1993.6, Designed
to bring Mexican legislation into compliance with NAFTA's investment
52. See Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1 (outlining the Supplemental Agreement's
objectives).
53. See id. (outlining the Supplemental Agreement's objectives); infra notes 152-55 and accompanying
text (enunciating the Supplemental Agreement's purposes).
54. See infra notes 58-85 and accompanying text (enunciating supporting and opposing arguments).
55. See infra notes 58-85 and accompanying text (enunciating supporting and opposing arguments).
56. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments in support of NAFTA).
57. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text (setting forth the arguments against NAFrA).
58. See Miguel Noyola, United States/Mexican/Canadian View of Agreement Benefits and Drawbacks,
7 FLA. J. INT'L L. 55, 56-57 (1992) (describing the benefits that Mexico and its citizens will potentially gain
from NAFrA).
59. See Behr, supra note 8, at A6 (describing NAFTA's likely effects); see also Juanita Darling, Ford
to Create 850 Jobs in North America, L.A. TtMEs, Dec. 17, 1993, at DI [hereinafter 850 Jobs] (describing an
investment by Ford Motor Co.). In the first major investment by a large manufacturer since the passage of
NAFrA, Ford Motor Co. announced its plan to spend $200 million, mostly in Mexico, to boost automotive
production. Id. In response, Harley Shaiken, U.C. Berkeley professor of labor and technology, predicted Ford's
investment to be the first of many significant investments that Mexico can expect as a result of NAFrA. Id.
60. Juanita Darling, Salinas Pushes Bill to Encourage Foreign Investment in Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
26, 1993, at D1 [hereinafter Salinas Pushes Bill].
61. Ley Para Promover La Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular La Inversi6n Extranjero [Law to Promote
Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment], D.O., Dec. 27, 1993, translated in TAX LAWS o1 THE
WoRLD: MExico, bk. 3, at 8 (Foreign Tax Law Publishers, Inc. trans., 1994).
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provisions, the law will provide prospective foreign investors with greater
opportunities to channel investment into the nation's economic sectors.6'
Proponents also point out that Mexico is a larger consumer market than
generally realized.63 The ability of Mexican citizens to purchase products
imported from the United States will benefit both the Mexican people and its
economy."4 Since 1986, U.S. exports to Mexico have increased dramatically.'
With NAFTA further reducing tariffs and barriers, prices will decrease, leading
to even more importation of U.S. goods 66 Not only is this growth good for U.S.
businesses, but economists predict it will boost the Mexican economy and result
in job creation and higher wages in Mexico.67 As their purchasing power grows,
the standard of living for all Mexicans will rise.68 Ultimately, proponents believe
liberalization of Mexican trade policies will lead to positive development
throughout Mexico.69
2. Arguments Against NAFTA
NAFTA opponents point to the maquiladora region as a small-scale example
of what will happen under NAFrA. Maquiladoras are export-oriented, typically
foreign-owned industries located along the northern border of Mexico.7"
Maquiladora facilities import raw materials and components to be processed or
62. Salinas Pushes Bill, supra note 60, at DI. Among other provisions, the proposed law will allow
Mexican subsidiaries of foreign corporations and Mexican companies with foreign investors to buy certain
previously restricted land, will permit foreigners to make portfolio investments in companies whose ownership
was restricted to Mexican citizens, will remove export requirements previously imposed on foreign owned
companies, and will remove minimum domestic content requirements. Id.
63. Experts Disagree Over Effects on Jobs, Growth, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1993, at 4B [hereinafter
Experts Disagree].
64. See Noyola, supra note 60, at 56-57 (describing how NAFTA will benefit Mexico).
65. For example, since 1986, the U.S. corporation 3M has increased its exports to Mexico nine-fold, and
Proctor & Gamble has doubled its exports to Mexico. McCartney, supra note 25, at B1. Furthermore, in 1992,
Sears' business in Mexico rose 27%, and 25% of what the company sold in Mexico was made in the United
States; six or seven years ago, virtually nothing sold in the Mexican stores was made in the United States.
Experts Disagree, supra note 63, at 4B; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. exports
to Mexico have increased from $12.6 billion in 1986 to $45 billion in 1993).
66. Experts Disagree, supra note 63, at 4B.
67. Abelardo L. Valdez, NAFTA: A Boon for the Entire Hemisphere, LEGAL TIMES, July 19, 1993, at 25;
see Noyola, supra note 58, at 56-57 (describing how NAFTA will benefit Mexico); see also McCartney, supra
note 25, at BI (predicting job creation in all three countries).
68. Noyola, supra note 58, at 56-57.
69. See Valdez, supra, note 67 at 25 (predicting that NAFTA will foster development in Mexican health,
social, and education systems).
70. E.g., Gary Gereffi, Mexico's Maquiladora Industries and North American Integration, in NORTH
AMERICA WITHOUT BORDERS? INTEGRATING CANADA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO 135,135-38 (Stephen
J. Randall et a]. eds., 1992); Susanna Peters, Labor Law for the Maquiladoras: Choosing Between Workers'
Rights and Foreign Investment, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 226, 228-33 (1990). There are approximately 2200
maquiladoras that employ nearly 600,000 Mexican laborers. Patrick Lee & Chris Kraul, Impact of NAFTA
Victory; Uniqueness of Maquiladora Could Fade, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1993, at DI.
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assembled in Mexico. 7' These materials and the equipment necessary for their
assembly are imported duty free, provided that at least fifty percent 72 of the
finished products are shipped for sale outside of Mexico.7' Finished products
shipped into the United States are subject to a U.S. duty only on the value added
in Mexico.74 The maquiladora program appeals to U.S. companies because of
the duty free import and tax privileges, Mexico's proximity to the United States,
and the abundance of cheap labor in Mexico.7' For these reasons, Mexico has
become the most important location for U.S. assembly activities abroad.76
NAFTA's detractors point out that Mexico's dependence on the maquiladoras
sector as a source of revenue serves to discourage enforcement of labor laws in
the maquiladoras.77 They assert that the Mexican government works with labor
union leaders to maintain a cheap, submissive labor force to attract foreign
manufacturers. 78 As a result, the rights of Mexican workers to organize indepen-
dent unions and to strike are not adequately protected.79
Further, while proponents expect increased purchasing power from higher
wages as a result of free trade, practices in the maquiladora region illustrate that
foreign investment in Mexico to date has not led to increased wages or to better
working conditions. 80 In fact, wages and benefits for Mexican workers have
declined thirty-two percent since a surge of U.S. plants began relocating to Mexi-
can border towns in 1980.81 Opponents question how consumption of U.S. goods
can increase when Mexican workers earn barely enough to support themselves.82
71. E.g., Gereffi, supra note 70, at 135-38; Peters, supra note 70, at 228-33.
72. Lee & Kraul, supra note 70, at DI.
73. E.g., Gereffi, supra note 70, at 135-38; Peters, supra note 70, at 228-33.
74. E.g., Gereffi. supra note 70, at 135-38; Peters, supra note 70, at 23 1-33. When a product is imported
into the United States under Tariff Item 807.00, the value of that portion of the product made of American
components is duty free. Id. at 231-32. The remainder, or value added in Mexico, is subject to a duty. Id.
75. Congressman Esteban Torres, The Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement and the
Implications for U.S.-Mexico Relations, Speech Before the Latino Leader's Conference (Oct. 12, 1991), in 12
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 101, 106 (1992); see Stephen Lerer, Comment, The Maquiladoras and Hazardous
Waste: The Effects Under NAFTA, 6 TRANsNAT'L LAw. 255, 257 (1993) (explaining that the majority of
maquiladora plants are U.S.-owned or -controlled).
76. Peters, supra note 70, at 233.
77. See Peters, supra note 70, at 233-35 (reporting that the maquiladoras have become Mexico's second
largest industry).
78. Hearing Explores Mexico's Worker-Rights Record, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 407 (July 26, 1993)
(News & Background Info.) [hereinafter Mexico's Worker-Rights Record]; see infra notes 108-15 and
accompanying text (describing the alliance between Mexico's ruling political party and labor union leaders).
79. See infra notes 104-30 and accompanying text (documenting the nonenforcement of Mexican laws
protecting the right to establish trade unions and the right to strike).
80. Torres, supra note 75, at 106.
81. Levinson, supra note 39, at 6. But see Labor Delegation Tours Mexican Facilities, 144 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 22 (Sept. 6, 1993) (News & Background Info.) [hereinafter Labor Delegation] (stating that since 1986,
real wages of Mexican workers have declined 60%).
82. Labor Delegation, supra note 81, at 23. As of August 1, 1993, the average daily minimum wage in
Mexico, converted to U.S. dollars, was $4.62, while the average daily cost of basic goods was $9.85. Mexico's
Angst, supra note 8, at DI.
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The Supplemental Agreement is designed to answer these objections.8 3 It
attempts to ensure enforcement of domestic labor laws in such areas as minimum
wage and hour levels, freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right
to strike.' Although strict Mexican labor laws cover these areas, the problem
has traditionally been one of enforcement.
8 5
C. Current State of Labor Law in Mexico
Contrary to the opinion shared by many in the United States that Mexico's
labor legislation is inadequate, Mexican labor laws provide extensive protection
for workers. These laws reflect a desire to place workers and employers on an
equal bargaining level.86 Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917
ensures workers a wide range of protected rights, and provides constitutional
authority for the 1970 Federal Labor Law.87 The 1970 Federal Labor Law
expands upon the basic rights contained in the constitution, covering virtually
every aspect of the employment relationship.8
Despite theoretically stringent protections, Mexican labor law is not
adequately enforced. 9 Common transgressions include: workers earn less than
subsistence wages, their health and safety is at risk, freedom of association and
the right to strike are denied, unions and employers collude to suppress workers,
and violence is perpetrated against workers."° The Supplemental Agreement is
designed to improve such conditions by encouraging each country to enforce its
domestic labor laws.9t
83. See infra notes 145-235 and accompanying text (outlining the Supplemental Agreement's purposes
and provisions).
84. See Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1, annex I (detailing the Supplemental Agreement's
objectives and the labor principles that the countries are committed to promote).
85. Thomas Gibbons, Tdugh Trade-Offs, 19 HUM. RTs. 26 (1992).
86. Ann M. Bartow, The Rights of Workers in Mexico, 1 I CoMP. LAB. L.J. 182,188-89 (1990).
87. See CONSTITUCI6N POLUTICA DE Los EsTADos UNIDOS MEXICANOS [Constitution] art. 123 (Mex.),
translated in CONSTnUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 88 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
trans., 1982) [hereinafter MEX. CoNsT.]. Article 123 states:
Every person is entitled to suitable work that is socially useful. Toward this end, the creation
of jobs and social organization for labor shall be promoted in conformance with the law. The
Congress of the Union, without contravening the following basic principles, shall enact labor laws
which shall apply to workers, day laborers, domestic servants, artisans and in a general way to all
labor contracts... and to the branches of the Union, the government of the Federal District and their
workers.
ld art. 123.
88. See Ley Federal del Trabajo [Federal Labor Law], D.O., translated in COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
WORLD; MExico: LABOR LAwS 1 (Foreign Tax Law Publishers, Inc. trans., 1993) [hereinafter 1970 Federal
Labor Law].
89. Gibbons, supra note 85, at 26; Zamora, supra note 42, at 431.
90. Zamora, supra note 42, at 431; see infra notes 104-38 and accompanying text (describing the
nonenforcement of Mexican labor laws).
91. See Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. I (setting forth the Supplemental Agreement's
objectives).
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1. Stringent Labor Laws
On paper, Mexico's labor laws resemble, and in some instances surpass, those
established in the United States. 2 The Mexican Constitution of 1917, article 123,
contains numerous labor-related protections.9" For example, the constitution
protects the right to form unions and join professional associations; provides for
the right to strike; prohibits anti-union discrimination; establishes minimum
wages, an eight-hour work day, and a maximum work week of six days; and
provides for overtime pay and maternity leave.94
Additionally, the 1970 Federal Labor Law expands the basic protections
contained in the constitution and places extensive restrictions and obligations on
Mexican employers.95 For instance, the 1970 Federal Labor Law regulates labor
contracts, minimum wages and hours, year-end bonuses and profit sharing,
workers and employers' rights and obligations, employment of women and
minors, collective labor relations, and strike procedures. 96 In certain areas,
Mexican labor law provides guarantees that are not included in U.S. law.97
Specifically, employees are entitled to share in profits equal to ten percent98 of
the employer's pretax income,99 and workers can only be dismissed for
92. Zamora, supra note 42, at 430-31.
93. See MEX. CONST., supra note 87, art. 123 (setting forth labor protections).
94. l The minimum wage provision of the constitution provides in part:
The minimum wage to be received by a worker shall be general or according to occupation. The
former shall govern in one or more economic zones; the latter shall be applicable to specified
branches of industry or commerce or to special occupations, trades, or labor.
The general minimum wage must be sufficient to satisfy the normal material, social, and
cultural needs of the head of a family and to provide for the mandatory education of his children. The
minimum occupational wage shall be fixed by also taking into consideration the conditions of
different industrial and commercial activities.
Id art. 123, pt. VI. In providing workers and employers with the right to form unions and to strike, the
constitution specifies: "Both employers and workers shall have the right to organize for the defense of their
respective interests, by forming unions, professional associations, etc." Id. art. 123, pt. XVI.
Strikes shall be lawful when they have as their purpose the attaining of an equilibrium among
the various factors of production, by harmonizing the rights of labor with those of capital. In public
services it shall be mandatory for workers lo give notice ten days in advance to the Conciliation and
Arbitration Board as to the date agreed upon for the suspension of work.
Id art. 123, pt. XVIII. "Differences or disputes between capital and labor shall be subject to the decisions of
a Conciliation and Arbitration Board, consisting of an equal number of representatives of workmen and
employers, with one from the Government." Id art. 123, pt. XX.
95. See 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88 (detailing Mexican labor regulations).
96. See id. (detailing Mexican labor regulations).
97. Zamora, supra note 42, at 431.
98. Id
99. 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88, paras. 117-31. The law also provides, however, that "the
worker's right to share in profits shall not imply any right to intervene in the management or administration of
the undertaking." Id para. 131.
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cause." Mexican law establishes federal and state conciliation and arbitration
boards to mediate alleged violations of labor law or collective bargaining agree-
ments. These boards also preside over conciliations in case of a strike.'01 These
boards consist of an equal number of representatives of employees and employers,
with one representative from government."° The conciliation and arbitration
boards hear cases falling primarily into three categories: complaints from indi-
vidual workers that their statutory or contractual rights were violated, collective
disputes in which a union claims that collective legal or economic rights are
jeopardized, and issues arising out of actual or potential strikes.'03
2. Nonenforcement of Labor Laws
When U.S. manufacturing facilities began relocating to Mexico, the Mexican
government regarded the maquiladora operations as a source of employment for
Mexican citizens, a vehicle for technology transfer, a way to train Mexican
workers, and a means of generating foreign exchange. 4 In order to gain these
benefits and to prevent adverse effects on foreign investment, the Mexican
government adopted a hands-off approach to enforcing labor regulations. 5
Despite laws regulating freedom of association, collective bargaining, and mini-
mum wages, workers in maquiladora industries in practice do not enjoy the right
to strike or to organize unions, and often wages barely reach subsistence
levels."° The government has maintained control over the labor force through
close cooperation between labor union leaders and the dominant political party,
100. Id. paras. 46-48. Where an employee is terminated without cause, the employer may be compelled
to reinstate the employee in the position he occupied, or pay indemnification equal to three months' salary,
whichever the employee prefers. Id. para. 48.
101. See MEX. CONST., supra note 87, art. 123, pt. XX. Labor law enforcement is the exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal authorities in matters relating to textiles, electricity, motion pictures, rubber, sugar, mining,
petrochemicals, metals and steel, hydrocarbons, cement, automobiles and parts, pharmaceuticals and medicines,
wood pulp and paper, vegetable oils and fats, food packaging and canning, bottled beverages, railroads, lumber,
glass and glass containers, and tobacco. Ua. art. 123, pt. XXXI. State conciliation and arbitration boards are to
settle all labor disputes that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the federal boards. 1970 Federal Labor Law,
supra note 88, para. 621.
102. MEX. CONST., supra note 87, art. 123, pt. XX.
103. Bartow, supra note 86, at 199.
104. Peters, supra note 70, at 227.
105. See id. at 227,234-35 (discussing how tremendous growth in maquiladora operations has discouraged
governmental regulation of the maquiladoras).
106. See Mexico's Worker-Rights Record, supra note 78, at 407 (reporting that the fundamental rights of
workers are persistently violated). While such violations occur throughout Mexico, the maquiladora plants are
used as an illustration of nonenforcement of Mexican labor laws. See Zamora, supra note 42, at 431-32
(describing inadequate enforcement throughout Mexico).
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the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucidnal, or
a. Right to Establish Trade Unions
Both the Mexican Constitution and the 1970 Federal Labor Law grant
workers and employers freedom of association and the right to establish trade
unions."' 8 Most Mexican unions are affiliated with regional or national
federations, and Mexico's largest labor federation, the Mexican Workers
Confederation (Confederacidn de Trabajadores Mexicanos, or CTM), includes up
to seventy percent of all union membersJ" Through its close alliance with the
CTM, the PRI maintains control over labor unions and the labor force.' The
PRI offers CTM leaders important government positions, in exchange for which
the CTM generates labor support for party policy."' Although the 1970 Federal
Labor Law defines trade unions as "association [s] of workers or employers set up
for the study, aim and defense of their respective interests,"'.. 2 the cooperation
between the PRI and the CTM banns workers' interests." 3 Union leaders with
concerns more akin to management and government are more loyal to the ruling
party and to its desire to appease foreign manufacturers than to the workers whom
they are supposed to protect."14 Furthermore, union leaders who hold govern-
ment positions spend little or no time in the plants themselves, which diminishes
responsiveness to workers' concerns." 5
In contrast to official unions, which are affiliated with the PRI, independent
labor unions are more forceful in their demands of government and manage-
ment." 6 Independent unions, however, are disadvantaged because they are
107. See Bartow, supra note 86, at 192-93 (describing the interdependence between the PRI and the CTM,
Mexico's largest federation of labor unions); see also Amy H. Goldin, Collective Bargaining in Mexico: Stifled
by the Lack of Democracy in Trade Unions, 11 CoMp. LAB. LJ. 203 (1990) (explaining that due to continued
support from unions, the PRI has controlled the Mexican government since 1928).
108. MEX. CONST., supra note 87, art. 123, pt. XVI; 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88, paras. 354,
357-58.
109. Bartow, supra note 86, at 192.
110. l
111. l. at 192-93. The policy of offering public positions to union leaders who cooperate with the party
is known as "co-optation." Goldin, supra note 107, at 209. Top leaders of the CTM regularly hold seats in the
federal legislature, enjoy salaried positions in local and state governments, serve as labor representatives to
government agencies, and hold positions on regional committees and arbitration boards. Id.
112. 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88, para. 356.
113. Bartow, supra note 86, at 193.
114. Goldin, supra note 107, at 203. But see id. at 211-12 (pointing out that Fidel Velazquez, the leader
of the CTM for the past five decades, has usually supported PRI policy, but has nevertheless secured significant
benefits for Mexican laborers).
115. Id. at 209.
116. Il at 210.
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usually not recognized by the Ministry of Labor," 7 and are frequently harassed
by the state due to their open opposition to PRI policies." 8 Indeed, attempts by
workers to organize independent unions have been met with discharge, blacklist-
ing, or murder."
9
b. Right to Strike
Although the Mexican Constitution defends the right to strike, the 1970
Federal Labor Law sets forth a series of notification procedures and conciliation
attempts that must be followed prior to striking. 20 Furthermore, for a strike to
be legal, its objectives must be permissible,' 2' and the suspension of work must
be approved by a majority of the target's employees." 2 If these conditions are
not fulfilled, the Conciliation and Arbitration Board may declare the strike legally
nonexistent."2 In such a case, if the striking workers do not return to work in
twenty-four hours, the employer has the absolute right to terminate any worker
and hire new employees without fear of liability.124
The requirements necessary to initiate a lawful strike are restrictive.' 25 In
1991, the government approved only 136 strikes out of 7000 strike petitions.126
This indicates that the right to strike may not be as vigorously protected as the
Mexican labor law suggests.
In addition to the legal procedures limiting strikes, the government and
employers often work in conjunction with the CTM to suppress and control
117. Id. at 211. Article 365 of the 1970 Federal Labor Law requires trade unions to register with the
Ministry of Labor in order to exist lawfully. 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88, para. 365. Since labor
contracts and the conciliation and arbitration boards are directed by the PRI's bureaucracy, if the Ministry of
Labor refuses to recognize a union, its leaders may not enter arbitration hearings on behalf of its members,
negotiate labor contracts, or hold positions on the government commissions on wages. Goldin, supra note 107,
at 211.
118. Goldin, supra note 107, at 211.
119. See Mexico's Worker-Rights Record, supra note 78, at 407 (describing testimony before Congress
of two ex-employees who lost their jobs as a result of union organizing activities). See generally Charles W.
Nugent, A Comparison of the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively in the United States and Mexico:
NAFTA's Side Accords and Prospects for Reform, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 197 (1994) (discussing the right to
organize and bargain collectively in Mexico).
120. See 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88, paras. 450-51, 459, 920-38 (setting forth strike
procedures); Bartow, supra note 86, at 199-201 (outlining the procedures that the Conciliation and Arbitration
Board, employers, and employees must follow in resolving labor disputes).
121. See 1970 Federal Labor Law, supra note 88, paras. 450, 459. Permissible objectives of a justified
strike include: forcing an employer to enter into a collective bargaining agreement or to renew an expired one,
compelling the fulfillment of a collective or some other binding agreement, and demanding compliance with
statutory profit sharing or bonus provisions. Id. para. 450.
122. Id. paras. 451, 459.
123. Id. para. 459.
124. Id. para. 932.
125. See id. paras. 450-51, 459, 920-38 (setting forth strike procedures).
126. American Enterprise Institute North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Debate, Fed. News
Serv., Nov. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NAFTA File.
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discontented workers.127 In one instance at the Ford Motor Company plant in
Cuautitlan in 1990, CTM hired strikebreakers to attack union workers who walked
off their jobs, resulting in severe injuries and one death.' In 1992, after
management at the Volkswagen plant in Puebla lowered wages and revised work
rules with the cooperation of the union leadership, workers went on strike and
demanded an independent union. 29 After two weeks of striking, however, Mexi-
can President Carlos Salinas de Gortari intervened on behalf of Volkswagen,
allowing it to terminate its employment contracts, fire all of its workers, and
rehire them under a new contract. ta If the Mexican government is able to quell
strikes by beating workers into submission or by unilaterally abrogating their
contracts, the constitutional right of Mexican workers to strike is apparently
meaningless.
c. Minimum Wage Guarantees
The Mexican Constitution provides that minimum wages must be set at a
level capable of sustaining the material, cultural, and social needs of a laborer and
the laborer's family. t3 ' Mexican minimum wages vary according to the location
and type of work done. 2 and are legally binding on all employers. 133 In
reality, however, employers do not always comply with the laws, and union
leaders do not enforce them.' 34 Critics contend that the Mexican government
promotes nonenforcement in order to attract foreign investors with cheap
labor.135 Moreover, maquiladora workers are doubly disadvantaged, for they
earn less than their counterparts in Mexican-owned companies, despite being
equally productive. 36 For instance, employees of Pillsbury's Green Giant frozen
food processing plant in Irapuato earn the equivalent of only $3.70 per day. 37
127. See Goldin, supra note 107, at 213-14 (stating that using repressive techniques serves the PRI by
keeping potential dissidents in order); see also Gibbons, supra note 85, at 28 (recounting instances of abuse of
Mexican workers).
128. Levinson, supra note 39, at 10.
129. Id. at 9.
130. Id.
131. See supra note 94 (setting forth the constitution's minimum wage provision).
132. Goldin, supra note 107, at 219. There are 264 minimum wages in Mexico. Anthony DePalma, Vague
Mexico Wage Pledge Clouds Free Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1993, at Al. Wages vary according to
88 different categories of work, and there are three levels of wages for each category depending on the location
of the job. Id. For example, as of September 1993, the minimum wage for an eight-hour day as a general laborer,
converted to U.S. dollars, was $4.60 in very urban areas, $4.27 in somewhat urban areas, and $3.88 in rural
areas. Id.
133. Goldin, supra note 107, at 220.
134. Id.
135. Mexico's Worker-Rights Record, supra note 78, at 407; see Labor Delegation, supra note 81, at 23
(arguing that the purpose of such policies is to lay out a "welcome mat" to foreign investors).
136. Torres, supra note 75, at 102.
137. Id. at 106.
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Although workers receiving such low wages are desperate, they are unable to
protest because the government and most trade unions cooperate to keep wages
low, and efforts to start independent unions are quelled. 3'
d. Reasons for Nonenforcement of Laws
Some commentators contend that enforcement problems result from inade-
quate capital resources.139 They argue that the prosperity generated by NAFTA
could be used to improve the situation of workers." At the same time, the
Mexican government asserts that its objective has been to decrease inflation
through temporary price and wage controls. 141 The government maintains that
it will increase wages after the inflation rate is in line with that of its NAFTA
partners.142 On the other hand, critics of Mexican labor policy argue that the
government suppresses discontented workers and keeps wages low in order to
attract foreign investment, a goal it accomplishes easily through its control over
labor unions.
43
Whatever the reasons for lax enforcement of labor laws, free trade between
the United States and Mexico and its concomitant economic development should
generate pressure on the Mexican government to honor the rights of its workers.
The Supplemental Agreement is designed to promote enforcement through a
policy of collaboration, exposure of problems, and imposition of sanctions for
persistent violations.'"
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation was implemented
simultaneously with NAFTA to satisfy concerns about the Mexican government's
failure to enforce its labor laws and to protect workers' rights. 45 It establishes
138. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequate enforcement of Mexican
laws protecting the right to establish trade unions).
139. McCaffrey, supra note 5, at 469.
140. Il
141. Zimmerman, supra note 50, at 6. In December 1987, the Mexican government enacted the Economic
Solidarity Pact, which imposed wage freezes designed to lower inflation. Goldin, supra note 107, at 223. The
Pact has been periodically renewed since its enactment. 18-Month Forecasts of Fiscal and Monetary Expansion,
Pol. Risk Servs., Aug. 1, 1993, avdilable in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Mexico File. while this program proved
successful in decreasing inflation from 114% in 1988 to 15.5% in 1992, it decreased workers' buying power.
Goldin, supra note 107, at 223.
142. Alina A.C.E. Adalpe, The Marketing of an Agreement; Misinformation and Misunderstanding Plague
the Harmonious Implementation of NAFTA, RECORDER, July 21, 1993, at 8.
143. Mexico's Worker-Rights Record, supra note 78, at 407.
144. See infra notes 152-235 and accompanying text (detailing the Supplemental Agreement's purposes
and provisions).
145. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (enunciating concerns of NAFTA's opponents caused
by the nonenforcement of labor laws).
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a trinational commission to organize cooperative activities, to oversee dispute
resolution, and, if warranted, to impose fines or penalties for persistent labor law
violations!t4
To the disappointment of some, the Supplemental Agreement is not a com-
plete solution to inadequate enforcement of Mexican labor laws. 47 For instance,
a lengthy complaint process ensures that sanctions will be a last resort. 48 In
addition, violations of certain labor laws are not subject to penalties, and infor-
mation exchange, by itself, has minimal deterrent value. 49 Detractors must
remember, however, that the Supplemental Agreement, as part of a free trade
agreement between sovereign nations, cannot satisfy all expectations. 50 Despite
its weaknesses, the Supplemental Agreement provides a new mechanism by which
to address differences and expose problems.'' It should be regarded as a first
step toward realizing the ultimate goal-that all NAFTA countries honor and
protect the rights of their workers.
A. Purposes
The primary purpose of the Supplemental Agreement is to encourage each
country to enforce its domestic labor laws by utilizing a policy of information
exchange, cooperation, and collaboration.' To this end, the parties have com-
mitted to promote enforcement in many areas, including freedom of association,
the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, the right to strike, and
ensuring minimum wages. 5 3 Further, each party pledges to abide by procedural
guarantees to ensure fair and equitable proceedings for the enforcement of its
146. See infra notes 156-231 and accompanying text (describing the commission's structure, the complaint
process, and the potential penalties under the Supplemental Agreement).
147. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 39 (arguing that the Supplemental Agreement is not an effective
remedy for abusive labor practices); Hearing on NAFTA's Effect, supra note 15 (Rep. Collin C. Peterson,
Democrat from Minnesota, maintaining that the Supplemental Agreement fails to address the most fundamental
rights of workers).
148. See infra notes 172-208 and accompanying text (detailing each step of the complaint process).
149. See infra notes 152-235 and accompanying text (setting forth the Supplemental Agreement's
provisions and commentary relating thereto).
150. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text (explaining why labor issues were excluded from
NAFTA's main text).
151. See infra notes 152-231 and accompanying text(highlighting the Supplemental Agreement's purposes,
structure for cooperation, and method of resolving disputes).
152. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1, 3. Suggested action for accomplishing this goal
includes appointing and training inspectors; monitoring compliance and investigating suspected violations;
encouraging voluntary compliance; requiring record keeping and reporting; establishing worker-management
committees to address regulation of the workplace; encouraging mediation, conciliation, and arbitration services;
and initiating proceedings to seek sanctions or remedies for violations of labor laws. Id. art. 3.
153. Il annex 1.
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labor laws.)" Each party will also promote public awareness of its labor laws
by making information available to the public and by promoting education." 5
B. Structure for Cooperation
1. Commission for Labor Cooperation
The Supplemental Agreement establishes the Commission for Labor Coopera-
tion, which is comprised of a ministerial council and a secretariat. 6 The
council is the governing body of the Commission and consists of labor ministers
of each of the three nations.15 7 The council convenes at least once per year in
regular session, and its duties include directing the activities of the secretariat and
of any committees or working groups convened by the council; establishing
priorities for cooperative action and developing technical assistance programs;
facilitating consultations and information exchange between the parties; and
promoting the collection and publication of data on enforcement, labor standards,
and labor market indicators.5 8
The secretariat consists of an executive director and a fifteen member
staff.'59 The secretariat will periodically prepare background reports on labor
law and its enforcement, labor market conditions, and human resource develop-
ment. t" In addition, the secretariat will prepare a study on any matter that the
council may request.16 1 In doing so, it may consider any relevant information,
including that supplied by independent experts, and it may include proposals on
the matter.'62
154. Id art. 5. Such guarantees include, among others, public hearings, except where the administration
of justice otherwise requires; the opportunity for the parties to be heard; a ban on unreasonable charges, time
limits, or unwarranted delays; the right, in accordance with each country's law, to seek review of proceedings;
impartial tribunals; written judgments made available to the parties without undue delay; and the availability of
remedies, including orders, compliance agreements, fines, penalties, imprisonment, injunctions, and emergency
workplace closures. Id
155. l art. 7.
156. ld art. 8.
157. ML arts. 9, 10.
158. Id. The council is required to promote cooperative action among the parties in areas such as
occupational safety and health, child labor, work benefits, labor-management relations and collective bargaining
procedures, laws relating to the formation and operation of unions and labor dispute resolution, and equality of
women and men in the workplace. Id. art. 11. The parties may cooperate through seminars, training sessions,
working groups, conferences, joint research projects, and technical assistance. ar
159. Id. art. 12.
160. Id. art. 14.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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2. National Administrative Offices
The Commission for Labor Cooperation is assisted by a National Admini-
strative Office (NAO) for each party, the purpose of which is to bring labor com-
plaints to the attention of the Commission for resolution or dispute settlement.
63
Established by and in each country, it is a point of contact with governmental
agencies of that party, NAOs of other parties, and the secretariat. 64 Each NAO
is to provide publicly available information requested by the secretariat for
background reports or studies, another party's NAO, or an Evaluation Committee
of Experts.1
65
Under this structure, each government voluntarily contributes and exchanges
information relating to its labor policies and standards.'" The Supplemental
Agreement does not, however, contain any timetables or guidelines regulating
such dialogue, nor does it set forth potential penalties for failing to engage in
such cooperative activities.' 67 Without any mechanism to guarantee cooperation
or information exchange, the Commission is without power to promote labor law
enforcement.
C. Resolution of Disputes
1. Private Right of Action
The Supplemental Agreement commits each party to ensure that "persons with
a legally recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have appropriate
access to administrative, quasi-judicial, judicial or labor tribunals for the enforce-
ment of [its] labor law."' 68 Such persons are given the right to seek enforcement
of occupational safety and health standards, employment standards, industrial
relations laws, and collective agreements.
69
163. Id. arts. 15, 16, 21, 24.
164. d art. 16.
165. Id; see infra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (describing the duties of an Evaluation Committee
of Experts).
166. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1, 10, 11, 14, 16; see supra notes 152, 156-62 and
accompanying text (explaining that information exchange is one of the primary functions of the Commission
for Labor Cooperation).
167. The Supplemental Agreement's timing and penalty provisions govern only the resolution of
allegations of labor law violations. See Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 20-41 (outlining the
Supplemental Agreement's dispute resolution process from the initial NAO consultations to the suspension of
benefits); infra notes 172-208 and accompanying text (detailing the dispute resolution procedures and explaining
the types of alleged violations that can be challenged).
168. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
169. l Industrial relations laws include freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bargain
collectively, and the right to strike. Hearing on NAFTA's Effect, supra note 15 (statement of Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Rufus Yerxa).
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However, under the Supplemental Agreement's complaint process, only
governments, and not private parties, have power to initiate the various procedures
necessary to determine whether alleged labor law violations are sufficiently grave
to warrant fines or penalties. 7 ' Further, under the terms of the Supplemental
Agreement, no government may provide for a right of action under its domestic
law against any other government for violation of the Supplemental Agree-
ment."7 Even though the countries commit to ensure that individuals have a
private right of action, the Supplemental Agreement provides no mechanism by
which to enforce such a right. In order for sanctions to be a significant deterrent,
the governments of each country must be serious about enforcing the Supple-
mental Agreement and calling attention to labor violations.
2. Complaint Process
Cooperation underlies each step of the complaint process and it is the primary
method by which the parties address differences and resolve disputes. 172 Indeed,
under the terms of the Supplemental Agreement, the parties commit to "make
every attempt through cooperation and consultations to resolve any matter"
brought to their attention. 73
Any interested entity, such as an individual, labor union, or employer, may
bring a complaint to an NAO.174 The three NAOs collectively will examine the
labor law applicable to the situation. 175 Following the initial complaint and
NAO consultations, any party may request a meeting with another party at the
ministerial level regarding any matter within the scope of the Supplemental
Agreement. 176 The three council members are to make every attempt to resolve
the matter through consultations and the exchange of publicly held informa-
tion."
If a matter has not been resolved after ministerial consultations, any
consulting party may request the establishment of an Evaluation Committee of
Experts (ECE).178 The council will form an ECE if the matter is determined to
170. See infra notes 176-205 and accompanying text (pointing out that at each stage of the complaint
process only a government can request that the matter proceed to the next level).
171. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 43.
172. Id. art. 20.
173. Id.
174. Levinson, supra note 39, at 4.
175. See Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 21 (detailing the guidelines for NAO consultations).
176. Id. art. 22.
177. ld.
178. Id art. 23. After the formation of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) has been requested, any
other party may request that the council select an independent expert to make a ruling on whether the matter
is trade related or covered by mutually recognized labor laws. Id. annex 23. Affirmative rulings on these matters
are a prerequisite to the formation of an ECE. Id. art. 23.
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be trade related'79 and is covered by mutually recognized labor laws.' The
ECE analyzes patterns of practice in the enforcement of each party's occupational
safety and health standards, or other technical labor standards,'' as they apply
to the particular matter considered during ministerial consultations. 2 The ECE
presents to the council a final evaluation report assessing the party's occupational
safety and health, child labor, minimum wage, and other technical labor standards;
its conclusions; and practical recommendations.'
Under the terms of the Supplemental Agreement, alleged violations of
industrial relations matters-freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the
rights to organize unions and to strike-are reviewed by the NAOs and the minis-
terial council.' Complaints involving these rights are not, however, subject to
analysis by an ECE or arbitral panel. 5 As a result, the Supplemental Agree-
ment provides no authority to develop a remedial action plan or to impose
penalties for violations of industrial relations matters. 8
6
U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor has said that industrial relations
matters were omitted from the investigation and sanctioning processes to avoid
179. "Trade related" is defined:
[R]elated to a situation involving workplaces, firms, companies, or sectors that produce goods or
provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the parties; or (b) that compete in the territory
of the party whose labor law was the subject of ministerial consultations ... with goods or services
produced or provided by persons of another party.
Id art. 49.
180. Id art. 23. "Mutually recognized labor laws" means "laws of both a requesting party and the party
whose laws were the subject of ministerial consultations ... that address the same general subject matter in a
manner that provides enforceable rights, protections or standards." Id. art. 49. An ECE is to consist of three
members with experience in the relevant labor matters, and it may consider written submissions and information
from the parties; the secretariat; the NAOs; organizations, institutions, and persons with relevant expertise; and
the public. Id. art. 24.
181. 'Technical labor standards" means laws and regulations that are directly related to the prohibition of
forced labor, labor protections for children and young people; minimum employment standards, such as
minimum wages and overtime pay; elimination of employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, age,
sex, or other grounds; equal pay for men and women; prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
compensation in cases of such injuries and illnesses; and protection of migrant workers. Id. art, 49. It is
important to note that industrial relations matters-freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to
bargain collectively, and the right to strike-are not included in this definition and are thus not subject to ECE
evaluation. Id.
182. I& art. 23.
183. Id. arts. 25, 26. The final report and the parties' written responses are then tabled for consideration
at the next regular session of the council. Id. art. 26.
184. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (discussing NAO and ministerial consultations).
185. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text (pointing out that an ECE can only analyze the
enforcement of technical labor standards, the definition of which excludes industrial relations matters); infra
notes 198-202 and accompanying text (outlining arbitral panel functions).
186. See infra notes 198-202, 209-31 and accompanying text (discussing arbitral panels, action plans,
monetary penalties, and suspension of benefits).
186
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excessive interference with negotiations between labor and management. 87
Critics, however, argue that the signatory countries, by insulating such matters
from scrutiny, have endorsed the abusive practices inherent in the Mexican labor
relations system.188 They believe that the Supplemental Agreement permits the
Mexican government to continue restricting workers' bargaining strength.8 9
Further, at best, the three labor ministers will engage in consultations about indus-
trial relations matters.1tg Detractors contend that without any enforcement
mechanism, nonbinding consultations will not result in any major policy
changes. t91
Following presentation to the council of an ECE final report, any party may
request consultations with any other party regarding whether there has been a
"persistent pattern 92 of failure by that other party to effectively enforce such
standards" addressed in the report.' 93 Again, the consulting parties are to "make
every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through
consultations.""9
If the parties fail to resolve the matter through consultations, any consulting
party may request a special session of the council.' 95 Unless the council decides
that a matter is properly covered by another agreement or arrangement of the
parties, the council will attempt to resolve the dispute promptly.'" It may call
on technical advisors, create working groups or expert groups, or make recom-
mendations to assist the parties in reaching a satisfactory resolution.
97
If the dispute has not been resolved after the council has convened, the
council will, on request by a party and by a two-thirds vote, form an arbitral
panel to consider the matter.'9 Unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, the
standard applied is "whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the
[p]arty complained against to effectively enforce its occupational safety and
187. See NAFTA Press Conference, supra note 26 (announcing NAFTA's supplemental agreements on
labor and the environment). But see Levinson, supra note 39, at 5 (arguing that such an explanation is
unconvincing).
188. Levinson, supra note 39, at 11.
189. See id. (declaring that the Supplemental Agreement's message is that abusive labor practices in
Mexico do not concern the United States).
190. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing ministerial consultations).
191. Levinson, supra note 39, at 11.
192. "Persistent pattern" means "a sustained or recurring pattern of practice." Supplemental Agreement,
supra note 1, art. 49.
193. Id. art. 27.
194. Id.
195. Id art. 28.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. art. 29. Note again that the alleged persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce occupational
safety and health, child labor, minimum wage, or other technical labor standards must be trade related and
covered by mutually recognized labor laws. Id An arbitral panel is to comprise five members. Id. art. 32.
Panelists must have expertise or experience in labor law or its enforcement, in the resolution of disputes arising
under international agreements, or other relevant expertise or experience. Id. art. 30.
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health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards.""' The Supple-
mental Agreement provides that a party has effectively enforced such standards
when the party's actions reflect a "reasonable exercise of discretion" in regulating
or investigating labor matters, or result from "bona fide decisions to allocate
resources to enforcement in respect of other labor matters determined to have
higher priorities."' "'
The panel shall present to the disputing parties a report of its determination
as to whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce
the relevant labor standards, and, if the determination is affirmative, its recom-
mendations for the resolution of the dispute.2"' The report will normally
recommend implementation of an action plan mutually satisfactory to the
disputing parties and sufficient to remedy the pattern of nonenforcement.
202
As detailed above, before any penalties for labor law violations can be
imposed, a convoluted and time consuming complaint process must be followed.
Specifically, a challenge must proceed through numerous attempts to arrive at a
mutually satisfactory resolution.2 3 Stated briefly, the claim must proceed
through NAO and ministerial consultations, an ECE assessment, party consulta-
tions, a special session of the council, and an arbitral panel determination as to
the existence of a persistent pattern of failure to enforce the relevant labor stan-
dard. 2 °4 This lengthy and bureaucratic process ensures that sanctions will
rarely, if ever, be imposed.05
Of great significance to some critics is the "escape hatch" contained in the
Supplemental Agreement's definition of effective enforcement. 206 Under this
definition, a government can defend its inaction when the inaction reflects a
reasonable exercise of discretion or results from decisions to allocate enforcement
resources to violations having higher priorities.2' In the words of one critic, the
exception "is so broad it virtually guarantees that sanctions can never be
199. Id. art. 33; see supra note 181 (defining "technical labor standards").
200. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 49.
201. Id. arts. 36, 37.
202. Id. arts. 36-38.
203. See idt arts. 20, 22, 27-28 (declaring that the parties must at all times endeavor to reach mutually
satisfactory solutions through cooperation and consultations).
204. See supra notes 172-202 and accompanying text (setting forth each step of the complaint process).
205. NAFTA's Labor Supplemental Agreement Provides Mechanism to Expose Labor Law Problems, 144
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 521, 525 (Dec. 27, 1993) (News & Background Info.); see Levinson, supra note 39, at
13 (describing statements made by the Mexican Secretary of Commerce to Mexican legislators that the
Supplemental Agreement's lengthy and complex process makes the imposition of penalties very improbable).
According to a summary released by U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor's office, trade sanctions are truly
a last resort, since the intent is to encourage parties to enforce their law, not to erect new trade barriers. NAFTA
Tests Clinton's Relationship with Unions, 144 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 16, 17 (Sept. 6, 1993) (News &
Background Info.) [hereinafter Clinton's Relationship with Unions].
206. See Levinson, supra note 39, at 12 (stating that, due to this clause, the prospect of imposing trade
sanctions for failure to enforce labor laws is remote); supra text at note 200 (defining effective enforcement).
207. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 49.
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invoked."2"8 Indeed, if faced with potential trade sanctions, a country may argue
that it exercised "reasonable discretion" or that its limited resources were
expended in another labor area-both of which are virtually standardless
exceptions.
D. Penalties
1. Monetary Enforcement Assessments
The Supplemental Agreement authorizes fines if the parties fail to develop or
implement an action plan.2' To clarify, if the disputing parties have not agreed
on a mutually satisfactory action plan within the allotted time, the panel will
reconvene to establish a sufficient plan.21" At this point, the arbitral panel may
impose a fine.2" If the disputing parties cannot agree as to whether a party has
fully implemented a previously established action plan, the panel will recon-
vene.212 If the panel determines that the party has not implemented the action
plan, the panel will then impose a fine.213
From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994, the maximum monetary penalty
is $20 million or its equivalent in the currency of the party complained
214against. Thereafter, fines may not exceed 0.007 percent of total trade in goods
between the parties during the most recent year for which data is available.215
Although the Supplemental Agreement sets a maximum amount, the arbitral panel
has great discretion in determining the actual fine.216
208. Levinson, supra note 39, at 12.
209. See Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39 (discussing the imposition of fines for failure to
implement an action plan).
210. d. No party may make a request to reconvene the arbitral panel for failure of the disputing parties
to agree on an action plan earlier than 60 days, or later than 120 days, after the issuance of the panel's final
report. Id. If the disputing parties have not agreed to an action plan, but no request is made to reconvene the
arbitral panel, the last action plan submitted by the party complained against will be deemed to have been
established by the panel. Id If the arbitral panel is reconvened, it will establish a plan of its own design
consistent with the law of the party complained against. Id.
211. Id
212. L No request to reconvene an arbitral panel for the failure of the disputing parties to agree on
whether the party complained against has fully implemented an action plan may be made earlier than 180 days
after an action plan has been established, and requests may only be made during the term of any such action
plan. Id
213. Id
214. Id annex 39.
215. Id
216. See id. In determining the amount of the assessment, the panel shall take into account:
(1) mhe pervasiveness and duration of the party's persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce
its occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards; (2) the
level of enforcement that could reasonably be expected of a party given its resource constraints; (3)
the reasons, if any, provided by the party for not fully implementing an action plan; (4) efforts made
by the party to begin remedying the pattern of nonenforcement after the final report of the panel; and
(5) any other relevant factors.
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2. Suspension of Benefits
When a party fails to pay a fine, the complaining party may suspend the other
party's NAFTA tariff benefits by increasing the duties on goods originating in the
other country.21 7 Such an increase may be applied only for as long as necessary
to collect, through the duty increase, the amount of the fine.2 8 When the panel
determines that the penalty has been paid, or that the party is fully implementing
the action plan, the tariff benefits will be restored.219
As indicated above, the Supplemental Agreement allows only limited sanc-
tions against those who violate workers' rights.220 Opponents point to the
absence of provisions authorizing, for example: compensatory and punitive
damages for workers or unions whose rights are violated; on-site investigations
or the targeting of specific companies; or criminal prosecutions for willful viola-
tors.22 The Supplemental Agreement permits only fines or the removal of
NAFTA benefits up to the amount of the assessment-benefits that would not
otherwise exist without NAFrA.22 The penalties seem lenient because once the
fines are paid, or the government implements an action plan, NAFTA benefits
will be reinstated, regardless of the violations' flagrancy.
223
It is difficult to predict the deterrent value of the monetary penalties. While
the Supplemental Agreement authorizes a $20 million maximum for the first
year,224 the imposition of a fine during this year is extremely unlikely. By the
end of the year, the Commission for Labor Cooperation and its component parts
will be newly formed, and will just have begun to collaborate and exchange
information.225 The likelihood of a complaint citing a persistent pattern of
nonenforcement of labor laws seems remote. Even if a complaint is filed, the
217. Ma. art. 41, annex 41B. In suspending NAFTA tariff benefits, the party may increase the rates of duty
to levels not to exceed the lesser of: (1) the rate applicable to those goods immediately prior to January 1, 1994,
and (2) the most-favored-nation rate applicable to those goods on the date the party suspends such benefits. Id.
annex 41B. In considering what benefits to suspend, a party should first seek to suspend benefits in the same
sector or sectors in which there was a persistent pattern of failure to enforce the relevant labor standards. Id. If
it is not practicable or effective to do so, the party may suspend benefits in other sectors. Id.
218. Id. annex 41B.
219. i art. 41.
220. See Clinton's Relationship with Unions, supra note 205, at 17 (recommending a wider range of
sanctions); supra notes 209-19 and accompanying text (describing fines and suspended benefits).
221. Clinton's Relationship with Unions, supra note 205, at 17; NAFTA to Raise Labor Standards in
Mexico, 144 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 97 (Sept. 27, 1993) (News & Background Info.).
222. See supra notes 209-19 and accompanying text (discussing fines and suspended benefits).
223. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (discussing the duration for which NAFTA benefits
are to be suspended).
224. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, annex 39; see supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text
(noting the maximum amounts at which fines may be set).
225. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text (outlining the duties of the Commission for Labor
Cooperation).
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entire dispute resolution process must be exhausted before fines can be
imposed.2 6 This includes various consultations, the drafting of reports, the
determination of a persistent pattern of nonenforcement of labor standards, and
the development and implementation of an action plan. 7 Completion of these
steps will undoubtedly take more than one year. Thus, since it is unlikely that
fines will be imposed during the first year, the authorized maximum of $20
million is insignificant.
Moreover, while a maximum of 0.007 percent of the total trade in goods is
authorized for each subsequent year,22 the panel enjoys substantial discretion
in determining the amount of the assessment actually imposed. 9 It must
consider, among other factors, the level of enforcement that could reasonably be
expected of a party given its resource constraints." This factor might be used
to justify lenient fines on Mexico, a lesser developed country." For these
reasons, it is impossible to ascertain the amount of fines that would actually be
imposed, making it difficult to foresee whether fines will have any deterrent
value.
E. Withdrawal
Article 54 of the Supplemental Agreement states that "[a] [p]arty may
withdraw from this Agreement six months after it provides written notice of
withdrawal to the other [p]arties. If a [p]arty withdraws, the Agreement shall
remain in force for the remaining [p]arties." 2  This clause is potentially
troublesome. It allows any of the signatory countries to unilaterally withdraw
from the Supplemental Agreement, but to continue as a party to NAFTA without
suffering any adverse consequences. 3 When a country is faced with fines or
penalties for persistent violations of its labor laws, article 54 permits withdrawal,
thereby condoning the continued violation of workers' rights. 4
226. See supra notes 172-208 and accompanying text (describing the procedural steps required before
sanctions can be imposed).
227. kL
228. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, annex 39; see supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text
(discussing the maximum amounts at which fines may be set).
229. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, annex 39; see supra note 216 and accompanying text
(outlining the factors the arbitral panel will consider in determining the amount of the assessment).
230. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, annex 39.
231. This is not to suggest that the United States and Canada will never violate their labor laws. It is just
a response to the concern expressed by many regarding the persistent nonenforcement of Mexico's labor laws.
232. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, art. 54.
233. ld
234. Id.
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On the other hand, the signatory countries' adoption of the Supplemental
Agreement was a prerequisite to NAFTA's formation." As a result, withdrawal
from the Supplemental Agreement could lead to NAFTA's disintegration, or at
least to the exclusion of the withdrawing country from NAFrA. Because Mexico
stands to benefit from NAFTA, its government may be reluctant to withdraw from
the Supplemental Agreement.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Supplemental Agreement in Context
Upon initial examination, the Supplemental Agreement appears somewhat
toothless. It makes no provision for enforcement of a private right of action, it
sets up a protracted complaint process, the imposition of sanctions is a last resort,
and violations of the rights to strike and organize are not subject to fines or
suspension of benefits.z 6 Although these features suggest that Mexico is
purposely retaining control over labor unions and employees to prevent any real
improvement in labor standards or enforcement, consideration of the purposes of
a free trade agreement and a closer examination of the Supplemental Agreement
suggest a contrary conclusion.
In negotiating an international treaty, governments must compromise in order
to accommodate their various interests and concerns. NAFTA is a free trade
agreement among sovereign nations and must therefore respect each country's
laws. 7 Thus, the Supplemental Agreement commits each country to enforce
its own national labor laws. 8 Indeed, it would not have been feasible nor
appropriate for the United States to have unilaterally demanded compliance with
its notion of the proper labor relations structure. The Supplemental Agreement
does not purport to create supranational harmony of laws modeled on U.S.
policies, for a free trade agreement cannot force social change upon one of its
signatory countries.2 9
Moreover, the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike are subject
to the Supplemental Agreement's general obligations regarding effective
enforcement of national laws, information exchange and collaboration, and review
235. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing why President Clinton conditioned NAFTA
on implementation of the Supplemental Agreement).
236. See supra notes 168-235 and accompanying text (outlining the Supplemental Agreement's provisions
and weaknesses).
237. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of sovereignty in negotiating
a free trade agreement).
238. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1-2, annex 1.
239. Hearing on NAFTA's Effect, supra note 15 (statement of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus
Yerxa).
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by the national administrative offices and the ministerial council."4 These provi-
sions do not provide any mechanism for enforcement, but they establish a new
means by which to expose industrial relations problems and to address differences
between the parties.24 Labor law violations occur under practices adopted
before NAFTA passed. The Supplemental Agreement, by providing a forum for
exposing and discussing problems, is the first step in reforming these abusive
labor policies.
B. Other Possibilities
1. Reduced Incentive to Violate Labor Laws
The adoption of a free trade policy may, in itself, reduce the impetus for the
Mexican government to maintain repressive labor relations policies. 2 Reduc-
tion in tariffs and other trade barriers, coupled with Mexico's growing consumer
market, should provide sufficient incentives for increased foreign investment in
Mexico.243 This stimulus may reduce the pressure on the government to attract
investors by controlling labor unions, suppressing workers, and maintaining low
wages.244
2. Pledge to Increase Minimum Wages as Productivity Increases
Critics point out that, although the Supplemental Agreement facilitates discus-
sion and collaboration designed to improve Mexican labor law enforcement, it
does not include a provision for narrowing the disparity between Mexican and
U.S. minimum wages." In answer to NAFTA's opponents who fear that U.S.
industry will migrate to Mexico to take advantage of lower wages, Mexican
President Salinas has pledged to link minimum wages to growth in productivity
and economic development.' The pledge provides some hope that the Mexican
240. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1-22.
241. Hearing on NAFTA "s Effect, supra note 15 (statement of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus
Yerxa). But see Levinson, supra note 39, at 11 (maintaining that sunshine alone is not enough to compel Mexico
to discontinue its abusive practices).
242. See supra notes 104-43 and accompanying text (describing Mexican labor law violations).
243. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text (discussing arguments in support of NAFTA).
244. Mexico's Worker-Rights Record, supra note 78, at 407; see supra notes 104-43 and accompanying
text (documenting the nonenforcement of Mexican labor laws).
245. Levinson, supra note 39, at 14. As of September 1993, the minimum wage for a general laborer in
Mexico, depending on the location of the work, was between $4.60 and $3.88 for an eight-hour day. Supra note
132. By way of contrast, the federal minimum wage in the U.S. was $34.00 for an eight-hour day. DePalma,
supra note 132, at Al; see generally supra note 132.
246. See DePalma, supra note 132, at Al (discussing President Salinas' minimum-wage pledge).
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government will work toward ensuring living wages for its workers.2 47 The
pledge was so vague, however, and measuring productivity so troublesome, that
a concrete plan must be developed before it can be considered meaningful.24
3. Super 301 Revival?
In its draft recommendations for NAFTA implementing legislation, the Senate
Finance Committee attached a revival of the Super 301 Amendment to section
301 of the Trade Act of 1984.249 In effect from 1988 to 1990, Super 301
required that tariffs and other trade sanctions be imposed on countries maintaining
significant trade barriers with the United States.5 In connection with NAFTA,
violations of Mexican laws regarding freedom of association and the right to
strike could be considered significant trade barriers, leading to Super 301 trade
sanctions.25' Due to concerns about the necessity of the measure, however, the
House of Representatives excluded it from its draft of implementing legisla-
tion. 2 Consequently, the Clinton administration did not submit NAFTA with
Super 301, but has indicated its support for revival of the measure and its
willingness to work with Congress to reenact it in 1994.253
If attached to NAFTA in the future, Super 301 could authorize sanctions for
persistent violations of industrial relations provisions. This would satisfy concerns
caused by the Supplemental Agreement's exclusion of industrial relations matters
from its sanctioning process.2
247. See id, (noting that if an accurate and reliable format is used to link wages to productivity, the
standard of living for Mexican workers could improve significantly).
248. Id.; see Levinson, supra note 39, at 14 (asserting that the pledge is meaningless because it can be
reversed by President Salinas or a future Mexican president without violating any written agreement).
249. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1993); Finance Committee Attaches 301 to NAFTA, 144 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
270 (Nov. 1, 1993) (News & Background Info.) [hereinafter Finance Committee]; Keith Bradsher, Traveler Fees
May Rise to Pay for Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 1993, at 10.
250. Finance Committee, supra note 249, at 270. Congressional Democrats intended the law to be a
weapon against what they perceived as Japanese trade barriers. Bradsher, supra note 249, at 10.
251. Hearing of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NAFIA File (statement of U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor).
252. Press Conference with U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, Fed. News Serv., Nov. 3, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, NAFTA File [hereinafter Kantor Press Conference]; see Finance Committee,
supra note 249, at 271 (explaining that amendments to NAFIA must be "necessary or appropriate" to the pact's
implementation).
253. Kantor Press Conference, supra note 252; Finance Committee, supra note 249, at 271.
254. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (pointing out that industrial relations matters are not
covered by investigation or sanctioning processes).
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V. CONCLUSION
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation is not the final solu-
tion to inadequate enforcement of Mexican labor laws, nor does it purport to be.
As illustrated by its emphasis on cooperation and its requirement that labor law
violations be persistent before sanctions are authorized, its aim is not to impose
severe punishment for each transgression. Rather, its primary purpose is to
encourage enforcement of domestic labor laws through exposing problems and
exchanging information. In this regard, the Supplemental Agreement establishes
a new forum in which the United States and Mexico together can analyze and
improve labor policies and working conditions.
While the creation of a mechanism for United States-Mexico discourse is
valuable, it is difficult to predict the actual effect the Supplemental Agreement
will have. If the signatory governments genuinely desire to improve labor law
enforcement in Mexico, they will cooperate fully with the trinational commission,
compelling it aggressively to pursue the Supplemental Agreement's goals. If,
however, the Supplemental Agreement was drafted simply to appease the U.S.
public, without a true desire to improve labor law enforcement, the Supplemental
Agreement will not generate significant change. Now that the machinery is in
place, the success of the Supplemental Agreement depends on the commitment
of each country to use it.
In evaluating the Supplemental Agreement, it must be remembered that the
United States, Mexico, and Canada have agreed to open their doors to one
another's products, services, and capital. A free trade agreement does not give the
United States authority to impose its domestic labor policies on Mexico. While
many people are eager to encourage improvement of Mexican labor law enforce-
ment, for reform to be meaningful, the United States must allow it to come from
within Mexico.
Elizabeth C. Crandall

